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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 17627 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The app~llant, PHILLIP FRANCIS, appeals from a conviction 
of Burglary in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for the 
~~ty ~f Weber, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, PHILLIP FRANCIS, was found guilty by the court 
sitting without a jury before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, of the 
crime of Burglary on February 13, 1980 and was thereafter sentenced to a 
term in the Utah State Prison pursuant to Utah Code Ann.' Section 
16-6-202 (1953 as Amended) not to exceed fifteen years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, PHILLIP FRANCIS, seeks a reversal of his convic-
tion and a new trial. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The appellant was a suspect in a burglary in Washington Terraci 
which occurred on April 30. 1980. The appellant was approached on four 
occasions by two detectives of the Washington Terrace Police Department 
for questioning concerning the burglary. The detectives wanted the 
appellant to submit to a polygraph test to prove his involvement in the 
burglary but the appellant refused. 
On November 3. 1980. the appellant was picked up by Detective 
Afuvui of the Ogden Police Department for questioning on a theft of a 
silver bar from an Ogden coin shop. The appellant was arrested and 
during a subsequent search some stolen coins and some drugs were recovere1 
from the appellants automobile. The appellant was charged with theft of 
the coins. possession of a controlled substance and driving on revocatio1 
The appellant was booked into jail. A short time later Detecti• 
Afuvai went to 1he jail to interrogate the appellant about some unsolved 
cases. Later on the same day the appellant was taken to the detectives 
office where he was interrogated for four hours by Detective Afuvai 
without assistance of counsel or anyone else. The appellant confessed 
to the theft of the silver bar and signed a statement containing his 
confession in exchange for a promise not to file the three charges 
which arose on that day. The appellant was then interrogated, without 
benefit of the miranda warning, again about the Washington Terrace 
burglary. There is testimony that during this period the appellant 
denied any involvement or knowledge of the Washington Terrace burglarv at 
the beginning of the session but after a period of time he indicated 
that he wasn't sure if he wanted to talk about the burglary. TI1e appellar 
-2-
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ltl 
testified during this period of time that Detective Afuvai paced the 
floor and at point stopped, hitched up pants and stated that the 
appellant was causing him to lose his composure. The appellant testified 
that he felt threatened and was frightened by Detective Afuvai and because 
of that he confessed. Detective Afuvai testified that during this period 
that he may have raised his voice and called the appellant a liar and 
that its not unusual to do so. 
A few days later the appellant was taken out to Washington 
Terrac2 on a traffic citation. Detective Jensen of the Washington Terrace 
Police Department had the appellant brought again to his office for 
questioning about the burglary he had confessed to. Detective Jensen, 
'ere( 
by thisJtime, had been informed by Detective Afuvai of the appellant 
of 
confession on the burglary case. The appellant hestitated to speak to 
1tiot 
Detective Jensen at his office because the appellant wasn't certain he 
!Clll 
v at 
wanted to make a statement to Detective Jensen. The appellant supposedly 
stated he felt that the office may contain some recording device, therefore 
he wanted to talk somewhere outside the office. Detective Jensen and the 
appellant drove to a secluded spot where they spoke for approximately one 
and a half hours about the burglary and other things. After the interrog-
ations the appellant finally confessed to Detective Jensen. 
The appellant was then charged and convicted of burglary, a 
~oond degree felony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONFESSION ELICITED BY DETECTIVE AFUVAI FROM THE 
APPELLANT WAS A RESULT OF COERCION, INTIMIDATION AND 
INNUENDO AND THEREFOR INVOLUNTARY AND THUS THE TRIAL 
-3-
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COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE CONFESSION INTO EVIDENCE. 
The issue is well settled that a confession which is the resuJ 
of coercion, intimidation or promises, is not voluntary and therefore 
inadmissible into evidence and that the use of such a confession at the 
time of trial is a violation of the due process clause of the fourth 
and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, Miranda v. 
State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S Ctl602, 16 ~ ej 2d 6J4, Blackburn 
v. ~labama, 361 U.S. 199, 4L ed 2d 242, 80 S Ct, 274, Haynes v. Was~ 
373 U.S. 503, 10 L ed 2d 513, 03 S ct 1336, People v. Sanchez, 451 P2d 74 
People v. Pettingill, 573 P2d 108. As the Supreme Court stated in Fikesv 
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 16 ed 2d 246, 77 S Ct 281, 
,, "The voluntary character of an alleged confession depends 
upon whether the confession as a whole was made voluntarily 
and without inducement or compulsion, and not whether the 
particular communications contained in the confession were 
voluntary or not. A confession is voluntary in law if, and 
only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. To be voluntary 
the confession must be the expression of free choice by one 
who, at the time he confesses, is in possession of mental 
freedom to confess to or deny a suspected participation in a 
crime, or to refuse to answer. The confession must not be 
produced by inducement engendering either hope or fear; by 
duress, intimidation, or other improper influences, or by 
fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury on 
the part of those representing the state." 
Thus pursuant to that holding the courts must hold inadmissible confessio 
which are the product of any of the influences described above. 
In reviewing a confession where there has been a claim of 
involuntariness the courts must examine the totality of the circumstance 
surrounding the giving of the confession to determine if there were an:-' 
impermissible influences exerted upon the defendant. Applyinr this 
-4-
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standard the court should consider all the facts attendant to the appellants 
·esul1confession, State v. Hall, supra, Haynes v. Washington, supra. 
According to the testimony received at the trial the following 
:he events occured; the appellant was suspected of committing the Washington 
Terrace burglary, however, there was not enough evidence to charge the 
v. appellant. The appellant was approached four times by a detective of the 
m hshington Terrace Police Department for the purposes of obtaining a 
~confession and/or taking a polygraph. The appellant refused each request. 
d 7~, !he appellant was picked up for questioning in Ogden City concerning an 
~ v. Ogden City case. The appellant was charged with the coramission of three 
offenses on that day and was booked into i ail. Detective Afuvai testified 
that the appellant was informed of his Miranda rie;hts two times up at the 
ly 
!ail, so we can assume that Detective Afuvai attempted to question the 
·e 
ind appellant about something but the appellant refused. The appellant is 
:ary 
me then brought downstairs into the detectives office where Detective Afuvai 
.n a :estified he was interrogated for some four hours. During this interroga-
ie 
iy tion period, the appellant is pursuaded to confess to the theft of the 
!ilver bar, an Ogden City case. After the signing of the confession, 
:he appellant is told he is going back to the jail, but instead the 
~ellant is taken back to the detectives office again where he is further 
essior'.nterrogated about the Washington Terrace burglary. Detective Afuvai 
:ndicated that Detective Jensen of the Washington Terrace Police Department 
f ·1u inforrnc<l him that they had attempted to obtain a confession from the 
tance!appellant but that the appellant had refused and he asked if Detective 
anv :ruvai could get the appellant to confess. The appellant testified that 
*ing this interrogation, that he claimed he knew nothing about the 
-5-
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burglary but that Detective Afuvai, nevertheless, continued to question . 
the appellant. The unrebutted testimony of the appellant was that Detecti~ 
Afuvai paced the room and became upset because of the appellants refusal 
to implicate himself by admitting his involvment in the burglary. The 
appellant testified that Detective Afuvai then stopped, hitched up his 
pants and said, "You're causing me to lose my composure." The appellant 
testified that he was intimidated by this gesture and statement and as 
a result confessed. Detective Afuvai testified that he and the appellant 
were on a friendly basis and that the interrogatories went peacefully. 
However, upon cross examination by the defense he conceded that he raised 
his voice during the interrogations and he may have called the appellant 
a liar . ., 
The United State Supreme Court in Haynes v. Washington, supra, 
in reversing a conviction held that where a confession is obtained as a 
result of threats or other impermissible techniques that due process h~ 
been violated and that "the question in each case is whether the defendar 
will was overborne at the time he confessed", citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 
372 U.S. 528, 534, 9 Led 2d 922, 926, 83 S Ct 917. The court citedoth1 
cases to support its position that " ... the true test of admissability is 
that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion 
or inducement of any sort." 
In the Haynes case, supra, the defendant was denied the oppor 
ity to call his wife or attorney for six days. The defendant was repeat 
told that there would be no phone calls until the defendant "cooperated' 
(emphasis added) and signed the confession. The court, applying the te! 
announced in the cases it cited held that the confession was not the 
-6-
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:roduct of free will, but resulted from the threats of continued incom-
t~icado detention and psychological pressure exerted against the defendant. 
The appellant readily concedes that the actions of the state 
1uthorities were more grievous in the Haynes case, supra, than the facts 
;urrounding the challenged confession before the court. However, the 
;opellant contends that when the principals cited and enunciated in Haynes, 
;upra, are applied to the circumstances surrounding the appellants confession 
t:hat there must be a finding that the appellants confession was a result 
f the ~rnpermissible pressure exerted upon the appellant by Detective 
,d\fuvai and not a product of the appellants free will. The appellant 
. ·elies upon the following factors to suppon: his contention that his will 
.o resist was overborne by the pressure exerted by Detective Afuvai. The 
!, 11pellant refused to confess to the Washington Terrace detectives. He is 
rrested on another charge by Detective Afuvai and is approached twice up 
t the jail by Detective Afuvai about some cases. At that point the 
anlppellant refuses to talk. The appellant is brought into the detectives 
, ffice where he is interrogated for four hours. During these four hours 
helhe appellant is in the office with Detective Afuvai alone without means 
s iescaping the pressure exerted by Detective Afuvai. The appellant 
mfesses to the Ogden City charge and signs a confession, he is then 
~m back to the detectives office interrogated further, even though 
1rt11e appellant has indicated his reluctance to speak about the case. 
1tc1iring this interrogation period Detective Afuvai raises his voice, 
l" aces the floor, maybe calls the appellant a liar and finally becoming 
est 1 frustrated by the appellants refusal to confess that he stops, hitches 
·his pants and states, "You're causing me to lose my composure!", it's 
-7-
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shortly after this that the appellant confesses. 
It is clear that the appellant conceded to the pressure of 
Detective Afuvai when he confessed. There was testimony from Detective 
Afuvai that the appellant was intelligent enough to recognize the consequer 
of confession. The appellant was also intelligent enough to recognize that 
the state had no evidence upon which to convict him of this charge, so 
we are left with the question, why did the appellant want to confess? 
It is the testimony of Detective Afuvai that the appellant was informed 
no deals could be made, so that could not be a motive to confess. The 
appellant contends that the confession was a result of the intimidating 
gestures and innuendo of Detective Afuvai and that that is what caused 
him to CODfess. Again applying these factors to the test in Haynes, 
supra, it is evident that the confession was not made voluntarily 
but was brought about by oppressive circumstances the appellant found 
himself in. Therefore, the confession, not being the product of a 
voluntary exercise of the appellants free will, should not have been 
accepted into evidence. The admission of the con.fe s~~ ion into evidence 
was a denial of due process and therefore the conviction should be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE FURTHER QUESTIONING AFTER 
INVOCATION OF APPELLANTS RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT WAS 
IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND 
THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE. 
In the case of People v. Pettingill, supra, the defendant 
was picked up on a burglary charge. 1he police, after informing the 
-3-
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defendant of his rights to remain silent and right against self incrimina-
tion, attempted to interrogate the defendant, however, the defendant 
invoked his rights and refused to discuss the case. Two hours later 
the same police officer approached him again, again reciting the Miranda 
en1 
wamines, and again the defendant invoked his rights and refused to discuss 
at 
the case. Another officer from another jurisdiction approached the 
defendant sor.ie three days later, after ootaining some evidence and 
confessions from the defendants companions, and after showing the 
defendant the evidence he had obtained, recited the Miranda warning and 
the defendant confessed. The California Supreme, in reversing the 
:onviction, held the police officers violated the fourth, fifth, and 
·ourteen~h amendment rights. The court, relying on the Miranda decision 
nd a string of other California Supreme Court cases, held that once an 
ndividual has invoked his rights to remain silent then all interrogations 
'1st cease until and unless the individual approaches the authorities 
ndicating his willingness to waive his constitutional rights. As the 
upreme Court in Miranda stated, 
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is 
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any 
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain 
silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has 
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment 
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his 
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, 
subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, 
the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the in-
dividual to overcome free choice in producing a statement 
after the privilege has been once invoked." 
Applying that holding to the circumstances before the court 
·ls apparent that the interrogations by Detective Afuvai was in violation 
the protective devices created by Miranda. The undisputed testimony 
-9-
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is that the appellant was given the Miranda warning up at the jail on two 
occasions. Although there is no direct testimony that the appellant 
invoked his rights, we are still left with the question, why was the 
appellant ·given the warnings if there wasn't an attempt to question him 
about a 'c.ase? If the appellant hadn't invoked his rights to remain silent 
and/o'r his right against self incrimination but was willing to speak to 
Detective Afuvai why two warnings? If the appellant was willing to speak 
why was it necessary to take him downstairs and interrogate him for four 
hours? Even if ·Detective Afuvai attempted to speak to the appellant about 
other cases and the appellant invoked his rights, Detective Afuvai, never· 
theless, violated the appellants rights as set out in Pettingill, supra, 
because, ~as in Pettingill, all interrogations must cease and apparently 
it did not. 
Furthermore, in Miranda, the Supreme Court stated, "If the 
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questio1 
ing, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogations must cease." for 
"(with) out the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody 
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in produc 
a statement after the privilege has been once invoked." Again there is 
unrebutted testimony by the appellant that he stated he wasn't sure he 
wanted to talk about the Washington Terrace burglary. Taking into conside 
ation that the appellant has just confessed to the theft of the silver bar 
the fact he is told he was being taken to jail but instead is taken bacl 
to the detectives office, the fact that Detective Afuvai, who had 
supposedly been the appellants friend, is now pacing the floor raising 
his voice and maybe calling the appellant a liar and the fact that the 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l i?pellant is alone with Detective Afuvai who is approximately 5 foot 
·o inches, and weighs approximately 270 pounds, it is clear that the 
ippellant was indicating his desire to terminate the questioning and under 
:he Miranda decision the continued questioning of the appellant was in 
nt iiolation of right to remain silent and right against self-incrimination. 
Relying on the cases and facts cited above the appellant 
:ontends that his confession was involuntary. The appellant contends that 
:he continual interrogations by Detective Afuvai was in violation of his 
iut:ight to remain silent and right aeainst self-incrimination. 
~r- The appellant also contends that the confession was involuntary 
1ecause his will to resist the pressure of Detective Afuvai was outborne 
1y the e~austing interrogatories, the gestures and st.a1I'Ents of Detective 
'fovai and the belief that a confession was the only way to escape his 
1redicamen t. 
tiot POINT III 
or 
due 
THE CONFESSION OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ACCEPTED INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT WAS NOT 
GIVEN A MIRANDA WARNING PRIOR TO BEING QUESTIONED ABOUT 
THE BURGLARY CASE. 
The court in People v. Pettingill, supra, stated that once 
idefendant has invoked his right to remain silent that all questioning 
,ide:ust cease. This decision was based on the rational of the court that 
bar:he Miranda decision required that an individual be warned of his rights 
:k :gainst self-incrimination and that the individual be given an opportunity 
:o invoke these rights. In the Pettingill case the defendant had invoked 
1is right against self-incrimination and refused to confess. The police 
~tinued to interrogate the defendant for a period of time after the 
nvocation of the Miranda rights by the defendant. The court ruled that 
-11-
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because the defendant had invoked his rights that any further questioning 
was in violation of the due process clause of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
In the case before the court, there's testimony that the 
defendant waived his rights concerning the silver bar. There is also 
testimony that the defendant was not warned of his right to remain silent 
nor that whatever he said could be used against him. It cannot be argued 
that the defendant was ignorant of his rights in light of fact he had been 
warned just prior to the confession of the theft of the silver bar, but th1 
appellant argues that he was not given an opportunity to invoke his right 
to remain silent and his right against self-incrimination. 
Implicit in the warnings is the opportunity to invoke the 
rights outlined in the Miranda warning. Included in the Miranda warning 
is the question, "Having these rights in mind, do you wish to speak about 
the matter?" The purpose of this statement the appellant contends is to 
give the defendant the opportunity to invoke his rights. In the case befo 
the court this opportunity was lacking because irnmediantly after signing 
the confession of the appellant to the theft of the silver bar the interro 
gations began on the Washington Terrace burglary without the benefit of th 
opportunity to invoke the rights outlined in Miranda. Therefore, the 
defendant was, for all intents and purposes, deprived of his right against 
self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Miranda, case. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO ITS FINDINGS OF FACT BY 
NOT SUPPRESSING THE CONFESSION AFTER HOLDING THAT THE 
CONFESSION WAS AN ATTEMPT BY THE DEFENDANT TO APPEASE 
DETECTIVE AFUVAI AND AVOID INCURRING ANGER AND DISPLEASURE 
-12-
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The court erred in its application of the law by not suppressing 
the confession because the court indicated in its holding that it fotmd 
that the defendant was attempting to appease De~ective Afuvai in the hope 
if avoiding any anger or displeasure and any physical abuse by Detective 
\fuvai. All the case law cited in thethree preceding points indicate 
:hat the confession must be the product of rational intellect, Sanchez, 
;11pra, made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of 
1my kind, State v. Hall, supra. Clearly by the finding of the court 
1 ~he confession was involuntary, under the standard described above, 
1ecause the court specifically found that the defendant's will was over-
1ome by the pressure of Detective Afuvai and yet failed to hold the 
:onfessigp involuntary and therefore, inadmissable. 
o: 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in receiving 
he appellants confession into evidence. The appellant cites the courts 
olding that the appellants confession was an attempt on the appellants 
1art to appease Detective Afuvai as an accurate conclusion <Jlf.. the facts 
D 
h1resented ·to the trial court. The appellant asserts that the trial misapplie 
he law" to its finding of facts because the trial court clearly found that 
the confession was not voluntary. 
The appellant further contends that there was clearly prejudi-
ial error committed by the trial court in receiving the confession into 
rtdence. The appellants refusal to give a confession to the Washington 
~race detectives, the setting in which the confession was obtained, the 
' 111'.lh of the interrogation and the reluctance of the appellant to speak 
~ut the crime, are indications that the confession was not given 
-13-
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voluntarily. That being evident, the trial court should have held that ~ 
the confession was involuntary and thus inadmissable. 
The appellant contends that the continued interrogatories aft 
the invocat.ion of his Miranda rights was a denial of due process which 
made the confession -elicited for the appellant inadmissible and therefore 
... 
the tri?-l .court committed prejudicial error in receiving the confession 
into· evidence. 
The appellant asserts that because of the admission of the 
confession into evidence that he was denied due process and therefore 
the appellant is entitled to a reversal of the conviction and a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROGER A. FLORES 
Attorney for Appellant 
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